On March 4, 2007, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, a major political agreement was signed between Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo and the leader of the New Forces, Guillaume Soro, under the mediation of Burkinabé president Blaise Compaoré. This compromise aimed to end five years of politico-military crisis that had divided Côte d’Ivoire in two. By favoring direct dialogue between the Ivorian protagonists, the Ouagadougou Agreement represented an unprecedented attempt at an African solution to an African conflict and marked an important step in the contemporary political history of Côte d’Ivoire.
March 4, 2007: The Ouagadougou Agreement, an African Attempt to Resolve the Ivorian Crisis
A crisis born from the Ivorian political rupture
The signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement can only be understood by placing the event within the context of the deep political crisis that Côte d’Ivoire had been experiencing since the early 2000s.
Following independence in 1960, the country had established itself as one of the most stable states in West Africa. Under the presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire experienced several decades of institutional stability and economic growth.
However, this stability began to crack after the president’s death in 1993. Political rivalries gradually intensified around the question of succession and the definition of Ivorian national identity.
By the late 1990s, the concept of “Ivoirité,” introduced into political debate, contributed to polarizing society. The political crisis worsened further with the 1999 military coup, followed by the electoral tensions surrounding the 2000 presidential election.
It was in this already tense climate that, in September 2002, an attempted coup was launched against President Laurent Gbagbo. The uprising failed to seize control of Abidjan, but the mutineers regrouped in the north of the country and took control of several major cities.
Côte d’Ivoire thus found itself de facto split in two: the south remained under government authority, while the north was administered by the rebels.
The Ivorian crisis then pitted several political and military forces against one another, each with profoundly divergent interests.
The first actor was the Ivorian government led by President Laurent Gbagbo. He relied on the regular armed forces to maintain state authority in the southern half of the country. For the government, the priority was to preserve territorial integrity and restore state sovereignty over the entire national territory.
Opposing him were the New Forces, a politico-military coalition born out of the 2002 uprising. The movement was politically led by Guillaume Soro and brought together several rebel factions that had taken control of northern Côte d’Ivoire. The New Forces justified their struggle by denouncing political discrimination and demanding reforms to the electoral and institutional system.
Surrounding these two Ivorian poles were also several regional and international actors. The Ivorian crisis indeed drew the attention of African organizations, the United Nations, and several states in the region concerned about the instability threatening the whole of West Africa.
In this context, Burkinabé president Blaise Compaoré played a central role as mediator between the different parties.
Between 2002 and 2006, several attempts were made to resolve the conflict. Negotiations notably took place in France, in Marcoussis, and later in several African capitals. These initiatives led to various political agreements intended to organize power-sharing and prepare for the reunification of the country.
However, these compromises quickly encountered implementation difficulties. The issues of disarming combatants, controlling the territory, and organizing elections remained permanent sources of tension. Gradually, one conclusion became unavoidable: the multiplication of international mediations had failed to produce a lasting resolution to the crisis.
It was in this context that the Ivorian president proposed a new approach. Rather than continuing negotiations under heavy international pressure, he suggested opening a direct dialogue between the Ivorian protagonists.
Discussions opened in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, at the beginning of 2007. For nearly a month, delegations representing the Ivorian government and the New Forces met under the facilitation of President Blaise Compaoré. The negotiations took place from February 5 to March 3, 2007.
On March 4, 2007, the discussions finally resulted in the signing of a political agreement between Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, in the presence of the Burkinabé mediator. This agreement represented an attempt at compromise between the two camps that had opposed each other for more than five years.
The text signed in Ouagadougou was based on several fundamental principles.
- The first consisted in ending the country’s territorial partition. Since 2002, Côte d’Ivoire had been divided by a frontline known as the “zone of confidence.” The agreement provided for the gradual reunification of the administration and institutions across the entire territory.
- The second principle concerned the disarmament of combatants. The presence of armed groups constituted one of the main obstacles to the return of political stability. The agreement therefore established a process for disarmament and reintegration of former combatants.
- The third axis concerned the organization of elections intended to restore the legitimacy of Ivorian institutions.
Within this framework, a new security mechanism was established. An integrated command center was created in order to coordinate the armed forces coming from both camps.
The implementation of the agreement quickly brought about a major transformation of the Ivorian political landscape.
A few weeks after the signing of the text, President Laurent Gbagbo appointed Guillaume Soro as Prime Minister. This appointment symbolized the integration of former rebels into state institutions. At the same time, an amnesty measure was adopted in order to facilitate national reconciliation and allow all actors to participate in the political process.
These decisions reflected the desire to build a political compromise capable of overcoming the fractures born from the civil war.
Despite the hopes raised by the Ouagadougou Agreement, the peace process remained fragile. The disarmament of combatants proved particularly complex. After several years of conflict, armed groups had developed local networks and economic interests that made their dissolution difficult.
Moreover, political tensions surrounding the electoral question persisted.
The organization of the presidential election, which was supposed to mark the end of the crisis, encountered numerous administrative and political obstacles.
These difficulties showed that the signing of a peace agreement alone was not enough to heal the fractures of a conflict. Despite its limitations, the Ouagadougou Agreement remains an important step in the political history of Côte d’Ivoire.
For the first time since the outbreak of the crisis, the main Ivorian actors agreed to negotiate directly the conditions for ending the conflict. This choice marked an important strategic shift. It reflected the desire to prioritize a national political compromise rather than relying exclusively on external mediation.
In the contemporary history of West Africa, the Ouagadougou Agreement thus illustrates a significant attempt at an African solution to an African conflict.
Notes and References
- Ouagadougou Political Agreement signed on March 4, 2007, between the Ivorian government, the New Forces, and the Burkinabé mediator.
- Philippe Leymarie, “In Côte d’Ivoire, an Army to Rebuild,” Le Monde diplomatique, May 20, 2011.
- National Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation Program (PNRRC), texts of the supplementary agreements to the Ouagadougou Agreement, 2007–2008.
